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Personal Identity
In the preceding chapter we have noted that in Spinozism and in the
Short Presentation of the Spinozistic System, Schleiermacher adopted
a thoroughly Kantian standpoint regarding the conditions of knowl-
edge. We only have direct access to representations, the content of
which is given to us in sensation. Furthermore, it is through the work
of the understanding, in particular as exemplified in the analogies
of experience, that we come to distinguish between inner and outer
sense. However, Schleiermacher saw that given this starting point, we
have no guarantee that what we perceive as phenomenal individuals
have a noumenal ground. From an epistemic standpoint, we have no
access to the vinculum of the monads. And from the standpoint of
metaphysics, Schleiermacher argued, once we posit that phenomenal
entities stand in thoroughgoing interdependence with one another,
it becomes very difficult consistently to posit more than a single
noumenal ground of all phenomenal reality. This, he believed, brings
us back to the Spinozistic relation.
Schleiermacher’s arguments in Spinozism move beyond the prob-
lem of the principle of individuation to the problem of personal
identity. Of course, the two questions are inherently related. His pro-
tracted discussion of personal identity is significant for two reasons.
First, it reveals the basic contours of Schleiermacher’s understanding
of subjectivity. This understanding is first and foremost a Kantian
one. Even after Schleiermacher moves beyond the position he takes
in Spinozism and in the Short Presentation, it remains a determinative
influence on his thought and has significant consequences for his
ethics. Given the discursive character of thought, the self is known
only through its world; we have no access to the “inner” self, only
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to the “outer.” Second, this discussion reveals the depth of Schleier-
macher’s grasp of what can be inferred from the Kantian theory of
subjectivity regarding the metaphysical problem of the relation of self
and world and the ground of both. His analysis proceeds from the
question of what can be inferred from the unity of self-consciousness.
It is heavily influenced by Kant’s argument in the chapter on the
paralogisms of the first Critique, where Kant argues that we cannot
validly infer the noumenal substantiality of the self from the identity
of self-consciousness. Schleiermacher argues, further, that even the
conditions of the possibility of practical rationality do not warrant
the inference that we are (a) noumenally real substantial beings and
(b) that we are transcendentally free. This chapter continues the
analysis of Spinozism begun in the last chapter. It is divided into two
parts. In the first I discuss Schleiermacher’s analysis of subjectivity
along with his claim that the unity and identity of self-consciousness
cannot ground metaphysical inferences to the noumenal reality of
intelligible substances. In the second, I discuss his understanding
of practical rationality and its relationship to determinism and the
mechanism of nature.
PERSON, PERSONALITY, AND THE PRINCIPLE
OF PERSONALITY
In a long passage in Spinozism Schleiermacher distinguishes between
“person” and “personality,” and claims that both concepts can be
found in Kant and Jacobi.1 Personality is “that property characteristic
of a thing making it into a person.” He will argue, however, that it is
a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of “complete” personhood.
Following Jacobi, he argues for a distinction between what he calls
the “personality” and the “principle of personality,” and defines these
terms in the following way: “the personality is the characteristic prop-
erty of a thing considered as a subject; the principle of personality is
1 As Grove notes, another important source for Schleiermacher’s discussion is the
article on person and personality in Carl Christian Erhard Schmid’s 1788Wörterbuch
zum leichtern Gebrauch der Kantischen Schriften nebst einer Abhandlung (Schmid,
Wörterbuch, 276); Grove, Deutungen des Subjekts, 102.
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the characteristic property of a thing as person if it is to be considered
purely as object (KGA I.1, 539). The upshot of this distinction is
the following: the principle of personality is objective and has to do
with whether, objectively considered, a being has its own principle of
individuation. This relates to our discussion in the previous chapter
regarding the vinculum of themonads. Personality, however, is merely
subjective. It concerns the relation between themerely logical, analytic
unity supplied by the transcendental I in Kant’s philosophy and its
relation to self-consciousness. Does the relation of the transcendental
I to self-consciousness ground valid inferences regarding the nature
of the metaphysical self? The problem, as Kant had clearly noted in
the paralogisms of the first Critique, is whether the analytic unity of
consciousness—the transcendental I in virtue of which all my repre-
sentations are mine—can be used as the basis for a rational psychol-
ogy in which we attribute substantiality, simplicity, personal identity,
and independence to the soul. In Spinozism, Schleiermacher clearly
sides with Kant on this problem; his discussion is clearly informed by
Kant’s paralogisms.
Given the distinction between the personality and the princi-
ple of personality, Schleiermacher delineates three possibilities. He
notes,
The foundational concept, namely, is overall identity with consciousness. a.
If a thing is itself conscious of this identity, and also really possesses it, then it
is a complete person, that is, a person in both respects, considered as subject
and as object. b. If it is conscious of this identity, but does not really have it,
then it is only subjectively a person but has no objective personality. c. If it
really has this identity, but is not itself conscious of it, then it has objective
personality but no subjective personality. (KGA I.1, 539)
Only if some thing both has consciousness of its own identity and
really possesses it can it be considered a “complete person.” There
are, however, two other possibilities. First, the fact that we are self-
conscious does not allow us to make inferences concerning the
noumenal reality of the self. It is therefore possible that a being
have self-consciousness (personality) without it having any genuine
substantiality grounding its consciousness of itself as an individual
being (a principle of personality). This is what is being considered
under option b. Second, what Schleiermacher describes under c.
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concerns the possibility that animals, for example, which are not self-
conscious, nevertheless possess a genuine principle of individuation.
This may also be true of things having a principle of individuation,
but which have no personality. All three options, a, b, and c, are gen-
uine possibilities because personality and the principle of personality
do not in any way imply or exclude one another. Each can exist with
or without the other.
Schleiermacher remarks that he does not believe that from a purely
theoretical standpoint “the second kind should be called a true per-
son” and “even so little do I believe one can deny the third kind
(the animals) would be a real person” (KGA I.1, 539). He thereby
claims that the principle of personality (the principle of identity) is
both necessary and sufficient for personhood. For our purposes, the
most interesting claim is that the principle of personality (genuine
noumenal substantial identity throughout change) is necessary for
genuine personhood. We have already seen in the previous chapter
that Schleiermacher denies that we have any epistemological access
to the principle of identity of a thing. And from a metaphysical
standpoint, he argues that we are led to conclude that there is only
one noumenal ground of all phenomena. This excludes the idea of a
plurality of noumenal agents.
The most significant aspect of Schleiermacher’s long discussion
of the relationship between the three concepts, person, personality,
and the principle of personality is his claim that the consciousness
of personality does not imply the substantiality of the noumenal self.
In other words, the having of personality does not imply possession
of a principle of personality. Moreover, Schleiermacher affirms that
when we view a person objectively, from a third-person point of view,
we can think of such an individual as an individual substance (that
is, such an individual is phenomenally, as an object of experience,
a substance). However, we cannot attribute unity and simplicity to
the consciousness of such an individual. In making these claims,
Schleiermacher clearly relies on the results of Kant’s paralogisms. His
argument here is worth quoting at length:
For Jacobi, the personality is what makes a being into a person of the second
kind (for insofar as the thing thinks of itself as subject, and the unity of
self-consciousness relates only to it as such, this cannot decide whether it
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possesses the personality of the first kind) and the principle of personality is
what makes a being into a person of the third kind. However, then he should
not say: each thing that possesses personality—and only this—is a person. If,
therefore, the concept of the third kind were the actual foundational concept
of a person, then the person of the second kind would be only an apparent
person. A person of the first kind, however, would be a person with this
consciousness, that she is a person. The question is whether a purely apparent
person is possible. Jacobi admits the Kantian assertion that I can doubt
whether my consciousness is continuous, more than he himself affirms it.
This case of an apparent person thereby touches purely upon the possibility
of doubt that consciousness can be continuous. In what sense can Jacobi
admit this doubt? This must determine the point of comparison between his
own doctrine and that of Kant’s. Jacobi defined the personality as unity of
self-consciousness and for him the person is a being that has consciousness
of its identity. Since only the personality is technically the whole of what
makes a being into a person, the consciousness of identity must thereby
have to do with the unity of consciousness. There is no doubt about the
latter. It is therefore empirically certain since I always refer one consciousness
to a preceding one, and see many together as a joined series in which the
representations that therein come to the fore are in fact different and outside
one another. The different acts of consciousness, however, are related to
one another through the identity of the subject through which the different
representations are referred. There is therefore no doubt concerning the first
expression (consciousness of identity), and no appearance of the same can
take place in its stead insofar as merely the identity of self-consciousness of
the transcendental unity of the I should be thereby understood. Alone the
old school made a leap and said: where this transcendental unity is identical,
there also its substratum, the substance, must be identical. If, then, this also
were to be understood under the identity, the consciousness of which makes
a being into a person, then in any case we find doubt and an appearance
of the same instead. Namely, the thing [is] subjective if it does not proceed
from itself and behaves itself as an object. Rather just as it considers itself
in self-consciousness, it can never achieve the idea of the identity of a real
substrate, for the consciousness, which is the sole ratio cognoscendi of self-
consciousness, relates itself only to the outer of the thing, not to its inner, and
the unity of this self-consciousness can thereby relate to the I and not to the
substance. From an objective point of view, I then admittedly have a reason
to attribute something that persists to a thing, to think the same thing as
having consciousness, and to thereby ascribe a continuity of consciousness to
it. In this way alone I cannot again attain the unity of self-consciousness, for
I have no reason to arrive at the unity and inner connection of consciousness
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from its continuity. And if I also do this hypothetically, in that I attribute to
consciousness a transcendental ground, then I may in no way identify this
transcendental I with the real substrate or substance. Here thereby a double
doubt, or moreover, uncertainty, is not only possible, but even necessary.
(KGA I.1, 539–41)
Briefly put, from the necessity of the transcendental unity of the I
(worked out in Kant’s transcendental deduction), we cannot conclude
to the substantial unity of the self. Schleiermacher notes that the “con-
sciousness of identity” has to do with the “unity of consciousness.” In
other words, the unity of consciousness is a necessary condition of the
consciousness of identity. What does Schleiermacher mean by such a
unity of consciousness? He tells us there is no doubt that there is such
a unity. He calls it “empirically certain” in the sense that we know that
we are aware of our own activity of bringing together representations
that are “different and outside one another” in one consciousness. It
is through the identity of the subject that the different representations
are “bound with one another.” What is the nature of this identity of
which he speaks?
In §16 of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Kant begins his discussion
of “that which itself contains the ground of the unity of different
concepts in judgements, and hence of the possibility of the under-
standing, even in its logical use.” His argument begins with the well
known proposition that “the I think must be able to accompany all
my representations; for otherwise something would be represented
in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much to say
that the representation would either be impossible or else would be
nothing for me” (KRV B132). This “I think” is what Kant calls the
transcendental unity of self-consciousness. It is the necessary condi-
tion for all combinations of representations. Since our consciousness
is discursive, that is, we are conscious of representations that are
“different and outside of one another,” these can only be related to
one another through the transcendental unity of consciousness. Such
a transcendental unity is a necessary condition for our ability to form
concepts, for it is through concepts that many representations are
thought together under one representation. Hence the transcendental
unity of consciousness relates to the analytic unity of the concept.
But for any kind of combination to take place, a transcendental
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unity of consciousness through which different representations are
grasped and then related to one another is presupposed. Since the
representations, considered in themselves, are different and outside
one another, the only way that they can be brought into relation with
one another is through some third thing, to which both are related.
This is the transcendental unity of consciousness itself, which first
relates to representation x, and then to representation y, and relates x
to y in and through the fact that they relate to it (the transcendental
unity of consciousness).2 This transcendental unity and its function
is what Schleiermacher refers to when he notes that “I always refer
one consciousness to a preceding one, and see many together as a
joined series in which the representations that therein come to the
fore are in fact different and outside one another. The different acts
of consciousness, however, are related to one another through the
identity of the subject through which the different representations are
referred.”3 If the “I think” were not to accompany all my represen-
tations, that representation which the “I think” did not accompany
could not be related to other representations, and hence could not
be thought. The “I think” is as such the ratio essendi of the pos-
sibility of the combination of all representations, and hence of all
thinking itself. The unity of consciousness to which Schleiermacher
refers is just this transcendental unity. This is the “identity of self-
consciousness of the transcendental unity of the I.”
The self -consciousness of identity presupposes the unity of con-
sciousness, that is, the transcendental unity of apperception. If I
am to be conscious of myself as one and the same thinker of my
representations, all my representations must be referable to a single
“I think.” I must, thereby, possess a unity of consciousness. This
unity of consciousness, however, need not imply a consciousness
of this unity, that is, self-consciousness. For instance, it is possible
for animals to have consciousness without having self-consciousness.
2 This analytic unity must be distinguished from the synthetic unity. The analytic
unity allows us to infer that these representations all belong to the same sub-
ject, whereas the synthetic unity implies combination of representations in accor-
dance with necessary laws making possible complex thoughts. As Henrich has noted,
“the conditions constituting complex thoughts must surely be distinguished from
the conditions of the mere co-presence of thoughts in one and the same subject.”
See Henrich, “Identity and Objectivity,” 171.
3 On this point, see also Grove’s discussion in Deutungen des Subjekts, 101–11.
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Schleiermacher does not bother to make this distinction here, as this
problem is not his principle concern. His main concern, rather, is
with whether the transcendental unity of apperception, and even
the self-consciousness of this unity, implies the substantial unity and
identity of the self. Schleiermacher mentions the “leap” made by the
“old school”, namely, the inference that “where this transcendental
unity is identical, there also its substratum, the substance, must be
identical.” Is it possible to move from the “I” of apperception ground-
ing the series of fleeting representations to the substantiality of the
self? It is precisely this inference that Kant claimed is unwarranted,
and his arguments for its lack of warrant can be found in his chapter
on the paralogisms of pure reason. Kant there argues that substantive
claims cannot be made about the transcendental subject, and that it
is an error to attribute substantiality, simplicity, personal identity and
independence to the soul. This is an error in judgment, which arises
when we seek the unconditioned unity of apperception and think that
it can be brought under the same concepts through which we think
objects of experience.4 Because the categories of the understanding
cannot legitimately be applied to this unconditioned unity, we can
have no concept of any object that corresponds to it (A339/B397).5
The transcendental unity of apperception is a condition of thought
that cannot itself be understood in terms of the conditions valid for
the objects of thought, that is, this transcendental unity cannot itself
be subsumed under the categories.
4 In her book Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion, Michelle Grier convinc-
ingly demonstrates that the paralogisms are a specific instance of Kant’s general
theory of transcendental illusion in the Dialectic as a whole. Moreover, she notes the
distinction between the inescapability of transcendental illusion, and the avoidability
of the mistake in judgment that results from the application of the categories of the
understanding to the transcendental unity of apperception, the supreme condition
of all thought. Grier correctly claims: “in taking this illusion to be unavoidable,
however, Kant is not claiming that we are necessarily deceived by it, as shown by
his own distinction between the illusion and the deceptive inferences of rational
psychology . . . the ‘illusion’ (here, in rational psychology) is said to manifest itself
in a transcendental ‘subreption,’ referred to as the ‘subreption of the hypostatized
consciousness [apperceptionis subtantiatae]’ (A402). However, Kant clearly wishes to
distinguish the ‘natural illusion’ in rational psychology from the ‘logical’ error that
characterizes the subsequent paralogistic inferences,” 149.
5 In his Reflexion 5553 Kant notes that the first paralogism mistakes the “unity
of apperception, which is subjective,” for the “unity of the subject as thing” (Kants
gesammelte Schriften, 18:224).
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In order to understand Schleiermacher’s remarks, it is instructive
to take an in-depth look at the Kantian arguments to which Schleier-
macher refers. In his introductory remarks regarding the dialectical
inferences of pure reason Kant characterizes the paralogisms in the
following way: “from the transcendental concept of a subject that
contains nothing manifold I infer the absolute unity of this subject
itself, even though in this way I have no concept of it” (A340/B398).
Kant’s discussion of the problem of the paralogisms takes into consid-
eration what was already noted by Hume in his A Treatise of Human
Nature, namely, “When I turn my reflection upon myself, I can never
perceive this self without one or more perceptions; nor can I ever
perceive any thing but the perceptions. ’Tis the composition of these,
therefore, that forms the self.”6 Hume’s reflections on the problem led
him to posit what is referred to, famously, as the “bundle” theory of
consciousness, the identification of the self with the various thoughts,
desires, and experiences that are the denizens of a person’s psyche.
Of course, Kant’s own theory of mind is significantly different from
Hume’s. At the basis of Kant’s understanding of mind is his positing
of the transcendental I grounding all logical functions of judgment.7
Nevertheless, Hume’s observation is telling and plays a significant
role in Kant’s development of the paralogisms. When combined with
Kant’s understanding of the function of the transcendental unity, two
things follow fromHume’s observation regarding the fact that the self
cannot be perceived. Both are inherently related. First, no perception
of which I am aware can play the role of the transcendental unity of
apperception grounding all functions of judgment. Any perception
is itself an element that must be related to other elements of per-
ception through the transcendental unity. Second, the transcenden-
tal unity of the subject contains nothing manifold. This is the nervus
probandi of the paralogisms. It is because the transcendental unity
can contain nothing manifold that one cannot have a perception of
the self. Such a transcendental unity cannot contain anything mani-
fold, for it is merely a logical function through which the manifold
6 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 634.
7 Paul Franks perceptively notes that the transcendental unity of apperception
“expresses the finite character of a subject whose thought remains empty without data
given to its receptive faculty.” Franks, All or Nothing, 62.
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is combined in accordance with the categories. Kant characterizes
the I of apperception as an “empty representation . . . of which one
cannot even say that it is a concept, but a mere consciousness that
accompanies every concept” (KRV B404/A346).
Kant develops the claim that the transcendental unity of the subject
contains nothing manifold in the following passage concerning the
first paralogism of substantiality from the A edition: “For the I is,
to be sure, in all thoughts, but not the least intuition is bound up
with this representation, which would distinguish it from all objects
of intuition. Therefore one can, to be sure, perceive that this rep-
resentation continually recurs with every thought, but not that it
is a standing and abiding intuition, in which thoughts (as variable)
would change” (KRV A350). The I of apperception is given with every
thought. The problem, however, is that it is an empty representation.
In other words, no abiding intuition is given with it, and hence it
cannot be characterized in terms of any such intuition. Without such
an intuition, it cannot be distinguished from other intuitions. And if
it cannot be so distinguished, it cannot be picked out in such a way
that it can be related to other intuitions. The self cannot, therefore, be
thought of as a substance in which thoughts change. The categories
of unity, simplicity, substantiality, and possibility are ultimately func-
tions of unity for our representations. But without such an abiding
intuition of the I that accompanies all my representations, there is
no way to relate the transcendental self to other empirically given
intuitions and to thereby unite them through a category. As such,
the categories cannot possibly serve to unify the transcendental self
with other intuitions, and hence the categories cannot be applied
to it. To apply the categories in such a way would be to treat the
transcendental self as if it were something empirically given, which it
is not.
The application of the concept of simplicity to the “I think” is
similarly problematic. Kant notes that “I am simple signifies no more
than that this representation I encompasses not the least manifold-
ness within itself, and that it is an absolute (though merely logical
unity)” (KRV A355). He continues:
so it is permitted to me to say, “I am a simple substance,” i.e., a substance
the representation of which never contains a synthesis of the manifold; but
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this concept, or even this proposition, teaches us not the least bit in regard
to myself as an object of experience, because the concept of substance is
used only as a function of synthesis, without any intuition being subsumed
under it, hence without an object, and it is valid only of the condition of our
cognition, but not of any particular object that is to be specified.
(KRV A356)
Whatever simplicity there is to the “I think” is not the simplicity that
could be attributed to an intelligible substance. It is, rather, merely
the logical requirement that all representations be related to the same
“I think” if judgment is to be possible. Moreover, as noted above,
the category of substance cannot be applied to the I in such a way
as to make it into an object of experience: as Kant notes, here the
notion of the I as substance can only be correctly applied as a function
of synthesis, that is, the transcendental I functions in such a way
as to allow my representations to be brought together through the
functions of judgment.8
Kant’s discussion of the substantiality and simplicity of the self
ground his discussion of the third paralogism of transcendental psy-
chology, namely that concerning personal identity. This problem is
what is at issue when Schleiermacher notes, with regard to what
he calls an “apparent person” (a being that is itself conscious of its
identity, but to which objective substantiality cannot be attributed),
that such a case “thereby touches purely upon the possibility of doubt
that consciousness can be continuous.”What does this doubt amount
to? In an important passage introducing the third paralogism, Kant
notes:
If I want to cognize through experience the numerical identity of an external
object, then I will attend to what is persisting in its appearance, to which,
as subject, everything else relates as a determination, and I will notice the
identity of the former in the time in which the latter changes.
(KRV A362)
Kant affirms that a necessary condition of the attribution of identity
to a thing involves the determination of some quality persisting in
8 On the relation of the “I think” to the logical forms of judgment in Kant’s
thought, see Beatrice Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, especially
64–72.
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appearance.9 If Kant’s analysis of this necessary condition for cog-
nition of the numerical identity of an object is correct, then right
off it can be seen that since the transcendental I contains nothing
manifold, it cannotmeet these conditions for the cognition of numer-
ical identity. Since the I has no manifold, no part of it can persist
in appearance. As such, I cannot continuously identify some quality
of the I that endures throughout the changes in its representational
states.
This is no doubt the argument that Schleiermacher has in mind in
noting that when the self “considers itself in self-consciousness, it can
never achieve the idea of the identity of a real substrate.” What he says
in what follows is elliptical, but of supreme importance for the under-
standing of the self that he will eventually adopt: “the consciousness,
which is the sole ratio cognoscendi of self-consciousness, relates itself
only to the outer of the thing, not to its inner, and the unity of
this self-consciousness can thereby relate to the I and not to the
substance.” That consciousness relates only to the outer of the thing,
and not to what is inner, concerns all objects of possible experience.10
9 As Longuenesse notes, “For the concept of substance has no other meaning than
that of being the referent of the term x to which all concepts of real determinations are
attributed in judgment. Outside this relation to accidents, there is no substance, just as
outside their relation to a substance there are no accidents” (Longueness,Kant and the
Capacity to Judge, 331). She cites Reflexion 5861, in which Kant claims “Accidents are
only the substance’smanner of existing according to what is positive.” She also cites the
Met. Volckmann, “An absolute subject which would remain once we had abandoned all
predicates cannot be thought and is thus impossible, because it is contrary to human
nature, for we cognize everything discursively” (Ak. –1, 429–30). The point is
that we can only know a substance through its determinations, but thesemust be given
to us as the real in sensation. The problem for Kant then becomes, “How is it possible
for ‘realities’ which are given to us only through the arbitrary and contingent interplay
of our sensations, to be ‘determined’ in respect of the relation between subject and
predicate in judgment?” Kant’s answer to the question lies in the synthesis speciosa.
As Longueness notes, “the schema of the relation between substance and accidents is
the temporal relation between a real that is permanent and a real that changes” (332).
But this means that in order to determine something as an empirical substance,
we must be able to relate a determination of a thing that persists to changing
determinations. Absent a real that persists and that can be related to continual change
of representations in the self, we cannot attribute substantiality to the transcendental
I. But since the I think has no manifold, with it there is given no reality that persists.
10 The idea that we can know things only in relation to us, as well as their relations
to one another only insofar as they stand in relation to us is firmly rooted in Kant’s
critical philosophy. This is what Schleiermacher means when he notes that we know
only the “outer” and not the “inner” of a thing. In his first Critique Kant notes
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This includes the self insofar as it is an object of experience, that is,
the empirical self (the empirical self must be carefully distinguished
from the transcendental self). In its consciousness of itself, the self can
relate itself only to the manifold of its representations. However, all
these representations go on to constitute the empirical world; they are
all relational insofar as they represent the world in relation to the self.
And insofar as some of these representations are of the self, they can
only be of the empirical, embodied self in its relation and interactions
with the world. As such, there is no representation of the inner self
that contains some quality that appears; indeed there cannot be one,
as the transcendental I does not itself contain a manifold. The unity
and identity of self-consciousness is a feature of the transcendental I.
This unity and identity, however, cannot be understood as a feature of
the empirical self, that is, the self as substance in the empirical world.
Hence the “unity of self-consciousness” can relate only “to the I and
not to the substance.”
In theCritique of Pure Reason, Kant frames the problem of personal
identity in terms of ascertaining the identity of the self through-
out its changing determinations, that is, in terms of the identity of
consciousness throughout the continual change of its representations.
“Everything in our cognition that belongs to intuition . . . contains nothing but mere
relations; of places in one intuition (extension), alteration of places (motion), and
laws in accordance with which this alteration is determined (moving forces). But
what is present in the place, or what it produces in the things themselves besides the
alteration of place, is not given through these relations. Now through mere relations
no thing in itself is cognized; it is therefore right to judge that since nothing is given
to us through outer sense except mere representations of relation, outer sense can
also contain in its representation only the relation of an object to the subject, and
not that which is internal to the object in itself. It is exactly the same in the case of
inner sense” (KRV B66–7); cf. KRV A283/B339, “a persistent appearance in space
(impenetrable extension) contains mere relations and nothing absolutely internal,”
and KRV A285/B341, “whatever we can cognize only in matter is pure relations
(that which we call their inner determinations is only comparatively internal).” For
a discussion of the problem of the relation of a thing’s monadic properties (properties
that a thing has in abstraction from all relations) to its relational properties in Kant,
see Franks All or Nothing, 36–51.What is important for our purposes here, however, is
that both Kant and Schleiermacher clearly affirm that we have no access to the thing in
itself, that is, the “inner” character of things independent of their relation to us. Hence,
all we have access to is the outer, that is, things as they appear and stand in relation to
us.We also only have access to the self as it appears, as it is given to us in inner intuition
and as acting in the external world. Of the self we also know only the “outer” self.
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Ultimately, the problem concerns the identity of the self through
time. How is cognition of the identity of the self through time possi-
ble? Kant provides two answers, each stemming from a different point
of view. From the point of view of the subject, time is in me. That is,
insofar as time is that which ordersmy representations, and given that
these representations are all mine, it goes without saying that it is the
same I that relates first to one representation and then to another.
Personal identity is unfailingly met with in my own consciousness. As
Kant notes:
Consequently, I relate each and every one of my successive determinations
to the numerically identical Self in all time, i.e., in the form of inner intu-
ition of my self. On this basis the personality of the soul must be regarded
not as inferred but rather as a completely identical proposition of self-
consciousness in time, and that is also the cause of its being valid a priori. For
it really says no more than that in the whole time in which I am conscious
of myself, I am conscious of this time as belonging to the unity of my Self,
and it is all the same whether I say that this whole time is in Me, as an indi-
vidual unity, or that I am to be found with numerical identity, in all of this
time.
The identity of person is therefore inevitably to be encountered inmy own
consciousness. (KRV A362)
The story is quite different when the question concerns the empirical
self, that is, the self as viewed from a third-person, “objective” point
of view. When a person is viewed from such a point of view, one
can, indeed, attribute substantiality to him or her in an objective
sense, that is, I can think of him or her as something in the world
interacting with other things in the world subject to all three of the
analogies of experience. However, the kind of unity and identity of
self-consciousness that I attribute to myself from a first-person point
of view cannot be attributed to the self from a third-person point of
view. As Kant notes:
But if I consider myself from the standpoint of another (as an object of his
outer intuition), then it is this external observer who originally considersme
as in time; for in apperception time is represented only in me. Thus from the
I that accompanies—and indeed with complete identity—all representations
at every time in my consciousness, although he admits this I, he will still
not infer the objective persistence of my Self. For just as the time in which
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the observer posits me is not the time that is encountered in my sensibility
but that which is encountered in his own, so the identity that is necessarily
combined with my consciousness is not therefore combined with his con-
sciousness, i.e., with the outer intuition of my subject. (KRV A363)
In other words, the unity and identity of self-consciousness is avail-
able only from the first-person point of view. This unity and identity
is merely the logical, or “formal condition of my thoughts and their
connection” (KRV A363). This is a functional unity given through
the activity of uniting all representations that are to constitute an
experience in one consciousness. As such, it can only be appre-
hended in and through this activity of uniting representations, and
can only be grasped from the first-person point of view. Moreover,
when Kant notes that “time is in me,” what he means is that from
the point of view of the subject, time is generated through (a) my
continuous apprehension of representations and (b) my connection
of these representations in accordance with the analogies in such a
way as to arrive at objective experience. Since the functional unity
of the I is what apprehends and connects these representations, it
must be logically identical throughout, that is, it is an a priori con-
dition of the unity of experience from the first-person point of view.
But when I observe another person, I do not have access to his or
her activity of uniting representations, and hence to the unity and
identity of that person’s self-consciousness throughout the person’s
experiences. I therefore do not have access to the time in which the
observer posits me, for it is “not the time that is encountered in my
sensibility.”
Kant further notes that the logical identity of the I does not warrant
the supposition that there is an underlying identical substance serving
as the substrate for the determinations of the self, i.e. its changing
representations. This is because the functional identity of the I does
not require the existence of a single substance for which the repre-
sentations serve as determinations. In an important footnote in the
third paralogism, Kant notes that it is entirely possible that such a
functional unity co-exist with a state of affairs in which “represen-
tations, together with consciousness of them, flow from one [sub-
stance] to another.” Hence “a whole series of these substances may
be thought, of which the first would communicate its state, together
with its consciousness, to the second, which would communicate its
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own state, together with that of the previous substance, to a third sub-
stance . . . ” He concludes that given such a scenario, the last substance
would be conscious “of all the previously altered substances in its own
states” (KRV A364). In other words, the functional unity, along with
all the representations it unites, could be passed on baton-like from
one substance to the next. Hence the functional identity would be
preserved, including the content that it unites with it as well, without
this having any implications concerning the identity of an underlying
substance.
Schleiermacher most certainly has these arguments in mind. He
notes that from a third-person, objective point of view I can think
of another person or animal as something that persists throughout
change and that stands in dynamic interaction with other changing
substances. I think of such individuals as elements in my objective
experience, in accordance with the analogies. From this third-person
point of view I “have a reason to attribute something that persists
to a thing,” that is, I can think of such an individual as a substance
that changes in dynamic interaction with other substances. Schleier-
macher also claims, however, that I can “think this same thing as
having consciousness,” and that I can “thereby ascribe a continuity
of consciousness to it.”11 However this does not mean that I have a
reason to “arrive at the unity and inner connection of consciousness
from its continuity.” In other words, my attribution of substantial-
ity to this other being does not warrant the affirmation that all of
this individual’s experiences are unified in virtue of a transcenden-
tal, logical I. Such a self can only be grasped from the first-person
point of view. In sum, Schleiermacher is quite aware that (a) the
transcendental function of uniting all representations in a single “I”
does not imply a single substance that underlies this function, and
11 The question here is what Schleiermacher means by the attribution of con-
sciousness and its continuity to another being from such an “objective” point of
view. This is especially troublesome given Schleiermacher’s immediate admission
afterwards that from the substantiality attributed to this other, I cannot conclude
to the transcendental unity and identity of that person’s consciousness. One might
assume that such a logical unity is the sine qua non of the attribution of consciousness.
However, on this point Schleiermacher also follows Kant. In the first paralogism Kant
notes that the claim that thinking can only follow from the absolute unity of a thinking
being is not an analytic one; as such we are not precluded from attributing thinking,
and thereby a kind of consciousness, to a being without also attributing to it the
analytic unity of thought. On this point see note 12 below.
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(b) the substantiality that I attribute to another conscious being, from
a third-person point of view, does not warrant the attribution of a
single, identical I that makes the “unity and inner connection” of
its experiences possible.12 This is most certainly the “double doubt”
that Schleiermacher affirms is not only possible, but even necessary
concerning personal identity.
Given this discussion, Schleiermacher then gives an account of
the three kinds of person. The designations originally provided had
only to do with “their formulas,” but now he provides an account
“in accordance with their content.” Given the possible combinations
between the “personality” and the “principle of personality,” the first
possibility concerns a being that has both personality and the princi-
ple of personality. He defines it, under (a) as “a personality, where the
unity of self-consciousness is necessarily connected with the identity
of substance of the transcendental subject” (KGA I.1, 541). Unlike
Schleiermacher’s preceding account of the first kind of person, this
definition highlights a necessary connection between the personality
and the principle of personality. Only given such a necessary connec-
tion between the two can we be certain that a single being possesses
both. Schleiermacher notes that this necessary combination of the
two is applicable to the “highest being in a necessary and complete
way” (KGA I.1, 541), that is, in God both are necessarily combined.
This is because God’s thought is (a) not discursive, like our own, and
(b) the content of God’s thought does not come from the outside,
that is, God’s thoughts do not stand in relation to (and therefore do
12 The idea that thought, or consciousness, might be possible without attributing
simplicity to the subject is discussed by Kant in the first paralogism. As Margaret
Wilson has convincingly argued (“Leibniz and Materialism,” Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 3, [1974]: 495–513), Kant is here arguing against an essentially Leibnizian
claim. Kant notes that the proposition “A thought can only be the effect of the absolute
unity of a thinking being” cannot be treated as analytic. This is because a concept
through which many representations are brought together has multiple parts, namely,
the multiple representations themselves; hence the unity of such a thought is the unity
of a collective. As such, it is conceivable that this unity be “related to the collective
unity of the substances cooperating in it (as the movement of a body is the composite
movement of all its parts)” (KRV A353). Kant seems to be arguing here that it is quite
conceivable to think of something extended, and that is thereby composed of parts,
as acting in the same way as a being that synthesizes its representations through the
functional unity of the “I.” However, it is important to note that such a view of a
thinking being is possible only insofar as it is viewed from the third-person, objective
point of view.
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not depend in any way on) anything existing independently of God.13
Rather, in God the unity of thought is equivalent to the complete
dependence of these thoughts on God. This kind of personality “is
completely problematic” (KGA I.1, 543), that is, we cannot know
whether such a being exists.
This combination is also attributed to human beings “by dint of
faith.” However, given the discursive character of human thought,
we can affirm no necessary connection between personality and the
principle of personality in human beings. This then brings us to
the second kind of personality, (b). This is “a personality where the
unity of self-consciousness is fully formed, but the identity of the
substance is not knowable from the same grounds, and therefore
a doubt regarding the complete connection of the two is possible.”
Under (b) from the first-person point of view, we begin with the
transcendental unity of the self, but cannot from there arrive at the
substantial identity of the self. As such, the second part of this defi-
nition, regarding the identity of substance, “is also completely prob-
lematic” (KGA I.1, 543). Schleiermacher notes “this personality befits
human beings, in that, namely, each directly ascribes to him/herself
the unity of self-consciousness and, according to the analogy, the
identity of substance; each ascribes to the other identity of substance,
and according to the analogy, also the unity of self-consciousness”
(KGA I.1, 541). We ascribe to others a transcendental unity of con-
sciousness in virtue of the fact that we think of their consciousness
as analogous with our own. And we ascribe substantiality to the
unity of our own consciousness in virtue of an analogy between
our own consciousness and that of others. However, while in our
everyday life we proceed in accordance with such analogies, strictly
speaking unity of self-consciousness and identity of substance are not
necessarily combined. Schleiermacher describes (c) as “a personality
in which the identity is formed by a substance equipped with con-
sciousness. In the third category are animals: in them, the “unity of
self-consciousness in accordance with the analogy is highly unlikely”
(KGA I.1, 541).
13 Interestingly, in §16 Kant also distinguishes our own understanding from that
of God’s. He notes, “An understanding, in which through self-consciousness all of the
manifold would at the same time be given, would intuit; ours can only think andmust
seek the intuition in the senses” (KRV B135).
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Schleiermacher claims that his own understanding of self-
consciousness is “completely parallel to the Kantian.” Significantly,
he notes that given this way of conceiving consciousness, “the unity
of self-consciousness (whether one take it as ground or consequent
of consciousness) relates itself always only to the phenomenal” (KGA
I.1, 542). What does Schleiermacher mean by ground and consequent
here? The ground of the unity of consciousness is, no doubt, the
analytical unity referred to by Kant in §16 of the first Critique. It is
the I that must accompany all my representations if they are to be
mine and is, as such, the ratio essendi of self-consciousness. Although
it is transcendental, it relates itself only to the phenomenal. It is a
necessary condition for the possibility of experience, that is, it func-
tions to unify representations belonging to the phenomenal, empir-
ical world. Such a ground cannot be thought without also think-
ing the consequent of the unity of self-consciousness, namely, the
synthetic unity. This synthetic unity is constituted by the successive
representational states of the subject bound together in accordance
with necessary rules. As Kant had noted, the identity of the subject
“does not yet come about by my accompanying each representation
with consciousness, but rather by my adding one representation to
the other and being conscious of their synthesis.” In other words,
“the analytical unity of apperception is only possible under the pre-
sumption of some synthetic one” (KRV B133). The analytical unity
means nothing without a possible content for it to unite. Moreover,
I can only become conscious of this analytical unity in and through
the synthetic unity. Hence the synthetic unity is the ratio cognoscendi
of consciousness. The importance of this latter fact for both Kant
and Schleiermacher cannot be stressed too much. The identity of
the subject is only cognizable in and through the synthesis of the
manifold of intuition.14 This means that the identity of the subject is
14 The point is key to the argumentative strategy of Kant’s transcendental deduc-
tion. The connection between the identity of the transcendental subject and the unity
of the synthesis of the self ’s representations is explored in depth by Dieter Henrich in
his article “Identity and Objectivity.” As Henrich notes, for Kant “self-consciousness
comes about only in conjunction with the consciousness of the synthetic functions
of the subject” (192). Furthermore, “The thought of the identity of a subject in all
its representations must also, from the outset, be formulated with reference to the
unity of all its representations. It knows itself as the identical subject only when
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wholly bound up with the identity of the world to which the subject
relates. It is, therefore, completely bound up with the phenomenal
sphere.
However, from that which we know of the self as phenomenon,
“no conclusion is valid as to what it may be as noumenon” (KGA
I.1, 542). Schleiermacher agrees with Kant that from the theoret-
ical point of view, insofar as the identity of substance relates to
noumena, “it is even for this reason an empty concept.” As noted
in the previous chapter, according to Kant, insofar as we posit
appearances and therefore phenomena, we must also posit that
which appears, and which can be thought in abstraction from its
relational properties. We must, therefore, posit things as they are
in themselves. Schleiermacher moves beyond Kant in speculating
about the possible character of such noumena. If we attempt to think
them,
two cases can be portrayed. First, it is possible that a multiplicity lies
at the ground of experienced consciousness, to which we ascribe the ‘I’
as phenomenon. That is, the so-called consciousness has already been
several transcendental subjects throughout the entire time series. This is
what Schmidt understood by the Kantian expression that consciousness
can be passed along. Another case is, however, yet also possible, namely,
absolutely no noumenon lies at the basis of the I of consciousness for
itself alone, but rather this I is merely a fluid property of another thing,
having only to do with time. Such a case strikes me in the Spinozistic busi-
ness. (KGA I.1, 542)
The first case Schleiermacher mentions is the one discussed above
in the analysis of Kant’s third paralogism, that is, for all we know
representational states replace other representational states. However, it is the subject
of representations, all of which it knows to be its own only if it is equally conscious of
the mutual referability of the contents of its representational states. In this awareness
it has original cognizance of the simplicity and identity of itself in equal measure”
(196). In other words, the self recognizes itself as the selfsame subject insofar as it
can connect all its representations according to a rule. It is in and through these
rules (the categories) that the content of one representational state is referable to
another. And it is through the referability of any given representational content to
every other representational content that the unity of the experience of the identical
subject is constituted. As such, the identity of the I is knowable only in the unity of
experience.
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the functional unity of the self and the content it unites is passed
on baton-like from one substance to another. The second possibility
is the Spinozistic one, where the I is merely a fluid property of
another thing. In such a case, the I has no independent existence,
since it is merely a mode of something else. Moreover, insofar as
Schleiermacher envisions it as a merely “fluid” property, it has only
a fleeting duration.15 Significantly, Schleiermacher leaves out another
possibility. This is the alternative favored by Jacobi, in which there
exist many substances standing in interaction with one another. How-
ever, Schleiermacher argues against this possibility in the latter part
of Spinozism for the reasons enumerated in the previous chapter:
first, we can have no epistemic access to the vinculum of the mon-
ads, and hence to the individuating principles of things, and second,
whenever we attempt to think the ground of phenomena, we are
inexorably led to the conclusion that there can only be one such
ground.
15 Once the Spinozism controversy had erupted, several authors were prepared
to recognize an affinity between Kant’s philosophy and Spinozism, in particular in
regard to the question of the self. If what we know of the self always relates—in one
way or another—to the empirical, phenomenal self, then the possibility of Spinozism
is left open, since we are not required to posit a plurality of noumenal selves. The
possibility that Kant’s transcendental self is a mere mode was already entertained
by Hermann Andreas Pistorius in a 1786 review of Schultz’s Erläuterungen. There
Pistorius notes, “The author’s [i.e. Kant’s] theory would secure [Spinoza’s] pantheism
against the important objection that an infinite thinking substance cannot be put
together out of an infinite number of finite thinking substances, for, if according to
[that theory] our substantiality is merely logical and apparent, if our I is nothing
but self-consciousness, and this only a subjective pre-requisite of the synthesis of
representations, a modification of other modifications; what then prevents it from
being the case that all these representations are modifications of the sole substance?
Thus reason finds all its demands satisfied in Spinoza’s system, if time determinations
and all representations related to them are merely apparent and subjective, and rea-
son would be unjust, after such a satisfaction, if it still wanted to seek a particular
Godhead, at any rate the interest of truth demands no Godhead other than the
intelligible world.” (Cited and translated by Franks, All or Nothing, 95–6; originally in
Landau,Rezensionen zur kantischen Philosophie 1781–87, 329–30). Pistorius makes the
point—not lost on Schleiermacher—that even the transcendental self is intelligible
only in relation to the synthesis of representations and calls it merely a “subjective
pre-requisite,” and as such can be understood as a mere “modification of other
modifications.”
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PRACTICAL REASON, DETERMINISM,
AND THE MECHANISM OF NATURE
The ultimate significance of all metaphysics concerning personal
identity is found in the sphere of morality. It is no accident, then,
that Schleiermacher proceeds to apply the results of his investigation
to the practical sphere. He begins by characterizing Kant’s definition
of a person in the following way: “a person is a rational subject that
sets itself ends independently of the mechanism of nature, and in this
regard personality is the property of a subject to be its own end” (KGA
I.1, 543). Importantly, however, he claims,
no equation allows itself to be made between identity of consciousness and
rational self-determination or independence from the mechanism of nature.
Even so little does the necessary and universal connection come to mind, for
the original meaning of person and personality has only to do with a certain
property of consciousness and has the least to do with the matter at hand.
(KGA I.1, 543)
What can be deduced from the identity of consciousness? If we follow
Kant, as Schleiermacher here seems to be doing, then: if there is to
be identity of consciousness there must also be a thoroughgoing con-
nectedness of our representations in accordance with the categories.
As such, only if there is unity among our representations (which
constitute our world) is there an identity of self-consciousness. The
proof of this proposition is central to Kant’s transcendental deduc-
tion. However, Schleiermacher notes that identity of consciousness
does not imply “rational self-determination or independence from
the mechanism of nature,” that is, it does not imply transcendental or
intelligible freedom.
Schleiermacher’s intimate acquaintance with Kant’s paralogisms
plays a key role here as well. In the paralogisms Kant had argued
that neither the identity of consciousness nor the spontaneity of the
intellect in determining objects allows us to equate self-consciousness
with an intelligible substance. And neither does it allow us to infer the
transcendental or intelligible freedom of such substances (rational
self-determination). The concepts of an intelligible substance and
transcendental freedom mutually imply one another. As Kant had
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noted in Reflexion 5653, “The concept of freedom is already by itself
necessarily connected with the concept of a substance with respect to
the intelligible, because the substance must be the ultimate subject
of its actions and cannot itself be the mode of action of another
substance.”16 But while the concepts of substance and intelligible
freedom imply one another, both Kant and Schleiermacher claimed
that neither is implied by the identity of consciousness and the spon-
taneity of the intellect. Schleiermacher’s reasons for this, as we shall
see, closely follow those of Kant. Both Kant and Schleiermacher affirm
the irreducibility of thought to matter in motion. But this irreducibil-
ity of thought to the mechanism of nature does not preclude the
possibility that both thought and the changing determinations of
the spatial substrate are expressions of a single underlying ground.
This thereby excludes the existence of both individual noumenal
substances and intelligible freedom. In the chapter on the paralogism
Kant had argued:
But now although extension, impenetrability, composition, and motion—
in short, everything our outer senses can transmit to us—are not thoughts,
feelings, inclinations or decisions, and cannot contain them, as these are
never objects of outer intuition, yet that same Something that grounds outer
appearances and affects our sense so that it receives the representations of
space, matter, shape, etc.—this Something, considered as noumenon (or
better transcendental object) could also at the same time be the subject
of thoughts, even though we receive no intuition of representations, voli-
tions, etc. in the way we are affected through outer sense, but rather receive
merely intuitions of space and its determinations. But this Something is not
extended, not impenetrable, not composite, because these predicates pertain
only to sensibility and its intuition, insofar as we are affected by such objects
(otherwise unknown to us) . . .
If matter were a thing in itself, then as a composite it would be com-
pletely distinguished from the soul as a simple being. But it is merely an
outer appearance, whose substratum is not cognized through any specifiable
predicates; hence I can well assume about this substratum that in itself it is
simple, even though in the way it affects our outer senses it produces in us the
intuition of something extended and hence composite; and thus I can also
assume that in the substance in itself, to which extension pertains in respect
of our outer sense, thoughts may also be present, which may be represented
16 Kants gesammelte Schriften, vol. 18, 311.
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with consciousness through their own inner sense. In such a way the very
same thing that is called a body in one relation would at the same time be
a thinking being in another, whose thoughts, of course we could not intuit,
but only their signs in appearance . . .
But if we compare the thinking I not with matter but with the intelligible
that grounds the outer appearances we call matter, then because we know
nothing at all about the latter, we cannot say that the soul is inwardly distin-
guished from it in any way at all. (KRV A358–60)
Thoughts, feelings, and desires are irreducible to space and its deter-
minations. But this does not imply an irreducible dualism between
the thinking self and matter, since both may be the expressions of a
single underlying ground. An irreducible dualism between thought
and the material world only follows if we think of matter as if it were
a thing in itself. Since, however, a necessary characteristic of matter,
namely its extension, cannot be a feature of things in themselves
but is, rather, only a feature of outer appearances (that is, of how
things must appear to us given the forms of sensible intuition),17 it
is not impossible that what is given in inner sense and what appears
in outer intuition have the same ground. As such, while the mech-
anism of nature would not directly determine the spontaneity of
thought, yet since both are the expressions of a single underlying
Something, mental occurrences could appear to supervene on phys-
ical occurrences. The correspondence between changes in thought
and extension would not be the result of one being the cause of
the other, but of both being the expression of a single underlying
ground expressing itself in two distinct ways. Given that we have
no positive concept of a noumenon, Kant notes that this idea of a
single underlying ground to both thought and extension cannot be
excluded.
Schleiermacher provides much the same argument at the begin-
ning of Spinozism. There Schleiermacher answers Jacobi’s charge that
Spinoza is forced to conclude that “discussion is a pure thing of the
body,” that is, that thought is merely the product of the mechanism
of nature. First, he notes that
as changeable in causal relationships, finite things bring one another forth.
Spinoza certainly depended not only on the ex nihil nihil fit, but also on
17 On this point see Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 237–54.
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the nihil ex nihilo fit. Rather, each thing must have something from which
it springs, that is, each thing must be understood as an effect, and therefore
too, each change in that which thinks. As change, effects are not brought
forth from the infinite directly (from the Infinite as causa libera), for each
finite thing springs directly only out of the finite, thereby from the finite.
(KGA I.1, 528)
The Infinite in no way directly institutes a change in the finite. Rather,
each change in the realm of the finite relates to a previous state of
the finite. However, changes in thought do not stem directly from
changes in the physical, extended stuff, “for thinking does not stem
from extension.” Thought, rather, stems “from that which thinks.”
Schleiermacher notes that according to Spinoza, “each change in that
which thinks, viewed as an effect, is related to a prior thought.”
Spinoza, he argues, does not think of thought as the mere product
of physical changes. It is true that such a change in thought “cannot
exist for itself alone, but rather only makes up the change of thing
taken together with a change in what is extended.” In other words,
while the genesis of each thought must be understood in terms of
prior thoughts alone, this does not preclude that for each change in
representational states there must be a corresponding change in the
physical, material substrate. Hence it may be the case that there exists
a necessary correspondence of changes in thought with changes in the
physical, such that no change in thought takes place without a change
in the extended, physical substrate. Changes in the material substrate,
however, must be accounted for in terms of prior states of the mate-
rial substrate, just as changes in thought must be accounted for in
terms of prior representational states. The one to one correspondence
between changes in thought and matter does not in any way mean,
however, as Jacobi surmised, that thought can be understood as an
effect of physical changes, or that thought is in any way reducible
to physiological events. Moreover, consciousness of physical changes
is not a “mere accompaniment” of such changes. Schleiermacher
claims:
If I myself take the hardest case of a moral action, it can very well be
thought in the spirit of the system that insofar as the decision contains
judgment and desire, it is an effect of what has been previously thought.
However, actual determination of the physical faculty, with which together
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it comprises only a change of the thing, is the consequence of a previous
change of what is extended, only that we admittedly must resort to such
changes which somewhat coincide with the material ideas or changes of the
animal organs of the psyche. Thus the doctrine of harmony leads always to
such subtleties, whether it be Leibniz or Spinoza who has put them forward.
How can Jacobi thereby say that discussion is a pure thing of the body? How
can he say the inventor of the watch has not invented the watch? The idea
of it [the watch] developed itself as a consequence of other ideas; that its
bodily accompaniments were a consequence of the movements of its body
is irrelevant. So it is with what he says of the effects of the affections. The
consideration which here drives him back from Spinozism is, however, only
morality, and this really loses nothing through this, that the determinations
of the physical faculty stem from changes in what is extended (especially
when their necessary coincidence is assumed), since he actually comes to
the decision insofar as it is judgment and desire. The last of Jacobi’s words
leave in doubt whether hemeans that what is extended determines actions, or
whether the infinite thing has this function. I have clarified myself regarding
the first, and the last seems to me to fully contradict the system and the
sentences already put forward. Even so I cannot grasp how he can say that
sensation and thought would be only concepts of extension, movement and
speed. There certainly belongs a simple distinction to it, in order to here
follow Spinoza correctly and exactly, but Jacobi is also equal to this task. I
think the matter so: Each change of a thing is a new relation of it to other
things; the relations of a thing can however be regarded from two points
of view and at the same time consist of two parts exactly harmonized to one
another. The expression of this new relation consists in the outer part in what
is extended and the representation of it in the inner part, which consists of
what thinks. Because both relate to the whole relation, so all that is in the
expression is also in the representation, and all that is in the representation
is also in the expression. Therefore I can correctly say: thought and sensation
are nothing but concepts of extension, movement, and speed. I can also say:
extension, movement, and speed are nothing but expressions of spirit, will
and talent. In this way do I think Spinoza will have understood his system in
this part. (KGA I.1, 529–30)
For Kant, the notion that thought and extension are both the
appearances of an unknown Something is a possibility left open by
his critical idealism. Schleiermacher, however, here declares this to
be his considered view. To think a change in a representational state,
and to view a physiological change, is to understand the same thing
from two points of view or two standpoints. Both extension and
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thought relate to the “whole relation,” that is, each is in its own way
an appearance fully expressive of the infinite. Because both have the
same common ground, “all that is in the expression [physical reality]
is also in the representation, and all that is in the representation is also
in the expression.” The two parts will thereby “be exactly harmonized
to one another.”
When Schleiermacher claims that “no equation allows itself
to be made between identity of consciousness and rational self-
determination or independence from the mechanism of nature,” his
discussion of the harmony of the progression of thought with physi-
ological change, which mirrors Kant’s discussion of the possible rela-
tion of inner and outer sense in the paralogisms, needs to be taken
into account. Given this discussion, Schleiermacher cannot be claim-
ing that thought (and hence the identity of consciousness in thinking)
is reducible to the mechanism of nature, or that it is simply an effect
of this mechanism. Thought is not independent of the mechanism of
nature only in the sense that both thought and nature express a single
underlying and common ground. It is because both are expressive
of the same underlying ground in such a way that harmony results.
What follows in Schleiermacher’s text, however, poses some difficulty
to this interpretation:
Even so little does the necessary and universal connection come to mind, for
the original meaning of person and personality has only to do with a certain
property of consciousness and has little to do with the matter at hand. For
on the one hand, if one assumes a receptivity that is completely free and
open, and is not limited to certain organs, it very well allows itself of a faculty
of representation and a consciousness without a faculty of desire, and on
the other hand, I do not see why an identical consciousness, a being that
possesses unity of self-consciousness, nevertheless could not be completely
passive in its actions and dependent upon the mechanism of nature, for just
as Kant had himself deduced, indisputably self-consciousness does not touch
upon self-determination. (KGA I.1, 544)
The question at issue here is, once again, whether the identity of
consciousness implies that the self is a substance. Kant had correctly
argued that the category of substance and intelligible freedom mutu-
ally imply one another. Something is a substance if its mode of action
can be explained in terms of its intrinsic or monadic properties, that
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is, the substance must in some way ground its accidents.18 If all the
changes that a thing undergoes are merely the effects of something
acting upon it, then it is a mere mode of that other thing, since
nothing about the thing functions to ground its properties in any
way that is independent from other things. Schleiermacher claims
there is no contradiction in thinking the identity of self-consciousness
along with the notion that this consciousness is completely passive
in its actions. He claims, in other words, that there is no contra-
diction in affirming the identity of self-consciousness, and in deny-
ing that the self is a substance and that its mode of action can in
any way be grasped independently of the mechanism of nature. This
would mean that whatever changes occur in self-consciousness can
be explained completely through the mode of action of something
else.
In this regard, several difficulties present themselves. First, it is
unclear how Schleiermacher’s idea of self-consciousness as com-
pletely passive or receptive does not contradict the spontaneity of
thought required in the activity of synthesizing one representational
state with another.19 The only way that the two do not contradict
18 Kant distinguishes between a substance and its powers and argues that the two
cannot be identified. The relation of power belongs to the category of causality, and
the relation of inherence in a substance is entirely different from it. In the Pölitz meta-
physics Kant argues that “power is the concept of the relation between substance and
accidents insofar as the substance contains the ground of the accidents.”Moreover, this
distinction is crucial to the avoidance of Spinozism: “For the concept of substance . . . is
thereby (sc., by identifying substance and power) in reality completely lost . . . just as
Spinoza would have it, since he affirmed the universal dependence of all things in
the world on an original being as their common cause, and by making the universal,
effective power itself into a substance, he converted this dependence into inherence”
(cited in Henrich, “On the Unity of Subjectivity,” 27).
19 So Kant, “Yet the human being, who is otherwise acquainted with the whole
of nature through sense, knows himself also through pure apperception, and indeed
in actions and inner determinations which cannot be accounted at all among impres-
sions of sense; he obviously is in one part phenomenon, but in another part, namely in
regard to certain faculties, he is a merely intelligible object, because the actions of this
object cannot at all be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility (A546–7/B574) [Italics
mine]. And in Reflexion 4220, Kant notes that “The expression ‘I think’ indicates
already that I am not passive in regard to the representation, that it must be ascribed
to me, and that its counterpart depends on me.” As Allison notes, “Largely against
the empiricists, he [Kant] argues that the senses provide the mind with the data
for thinking objects, but not with the thought or knowledge thereof. The latter, he
maintains, requires the active taking up of the data by the mind, its unification in a
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one another is through the argument Kant provides at A358, dis-
cussed above and echoed by Schleiermacher. Henrich summarizes
the results of this argument in a way that illuminates Schleierma-
cher’s point: “For even if consciousness is aware of itself in all its
thoughts as the ground of their being thought, it is still possible to
imagine that the conditions that bind consciousness to the laws for
the production of its own thoughts are not at all different from the
conditions that underlie the material appearances in their transcen-
dental substrate.”20 Hence what seems to be the spontaneity of self-
consciousness could be accounted for in terms of the transcendental
substrate, which also grounds the material appearances. Only in this
way can we think the spontaneity of thought as intrinsically related
to the material conditions, but such a relation would only take place
through their common ground, namely the transcendental substrate.
On such a scenario, there are ultimately no noumenal substances
that are intelligibly (transcendentally) free in their actions. Insofar
as, for Kant, transcendental freedom is inherently bound up with
the concept of a moral person, Schleiermacher is correct to claim
that the idea of the identity of consciousness does not imply moral
personhood.
Our analysis thus far has shown that what can be inferred from
an analysis of the conditions of the possibility of experience (the
identity of consciousness) does not allow us to conclude that there
are noumenal, transcendentally free substances. We cannot, in other
words, move from experience and its conditions to a positive con-
cept of noumenal substances, which is what would be required
in order to affirm the self ’s independence from the mechanism
of nature. The move from noumena to phenomena is equally
problematic:
If Kant wants to proceed, not from the phenomenal concept, but from the
noumenal, then I see even less how he could make such a use of a clearly
known concept and say something. If something corresponds to this con-
cept, then it must express itself through rational determinations of the will.
concept or synthesis, and its reference to an object. All of this is the work of judgment,
which is simply the spontaneity of the understanding in action” Allison,Kant’s Theory
of Freedom, 36.
20 Henrich, “On the Unity of Subjectivity,” 29.
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Even this would be a true contradiction. For since we know so little of the
connection between noumena and phenomena, then it would be laughable
to claim that a certain noumenon must produce such a phenomenon.
(KGA I.1, 544)
In his chapter “Phenomena and Noumena” in the first Critique, Kant
had argued that we have no positive conception of noumena.21 In
other words, we cannot think noumena through the categories, for
we have no guide as to how noumena are to be subsumed under
the concepts of the understanding. Hence Kant concludes, “that
which we call noumenon must be understood to be such only in a
negative sense” (KRV B309). Such a concept is merely a “bound-
ary concept,” allowing us to distinguish between things as they are
given to us in experience and their unknowable ground. Schleier-
macher emphasizes that since we can have no positive conception
of a noumenon, if we begin from the idea of a noumenon, we can
have no understanding of the connection between noumenon and
phenomenon. He thereby argues that even if we agreed that the
noumenal, intelligible self must “express itself through rational deter-
minations of the will,” we have absolutely no insight into how the
noumenal, intelligible self might manifest itself in the phenomenal
sphere.
But what of the connection that comes from “the other side,” that
is, that begins from the point of view of morality? In his Critique of
Practical Reason Kant had argued that morality is a fact of reason
and that morality and transcendental freedom mutually imply one
another. Allison has termed this claim the “Reciprocity Thesis.”22
While we do not understand it, “freedom,” Kant argued, is “the
21 Kant notes that “the transcendental use of a concept in any sort of principle
consists in its being related to things in general and in themselves” (KRV B298).
This merely transcendental use of the categories is “in fact no use at all, and has
no . . . determinable object” (KRV B304). Without the formal conditions of sensibility,
the pure categories lack “the formal conditions of the subsumption of any sort of
supposed object under these concepts” (KRV B305). Hence if “we wanted to apply
the categories to objects that are not considered as appearances, then we would have
to ground them on an intuition other than the sensible one, and then the object would
be a noumenon in a positive sense. Now since such an intuition, namely intellectual
intuition, lies absolutely outside our faculty of cognition, the use of the categories can
by no means reach beyond the boundaries of the objects of experience.”
22 Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom, 201ff.
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condition of the moral law which we do know” (KprV 5:5). We know
we are bound by the moral law, and this implies that we must be
transcendentally free. In Spinozism, Schleiermacher stands in funda-
mental disagreement with Kant on this point.While each “moral sub-
ject that can act in accordance with laws” is a person, Schleiermacher
affirms that this is true only in a “phenomenological” or subjective
sense. Even if “action in accordance with the representation of rules
presupposes the faculty of concepts and the ability to synthesize our
acts of consciousness in one [consciousness],” this does not imply that
moral subjects must be noumenal selves. In other words, Schleierma-
cher admits that action in accordance with rules presupposes both
the analytic and the synthetic unity of consciousness. In order to
act in accordance with such rules, the self must be conscious of the
distinction between itself and the world. This further presupposes the
ability to construct complex concepts in accordance with necessary
laws and to make judgments about objects. And in order to act in
accordance with rules, the self must be conscious of itself and its
desires; coherence in action is possible only through the structur-
ing of desire. It is clear that all of this involves the identity of self-
consciousness. But this identity of self-consciousness, Schleiermacher
argues once again, does not imply the substantiality of the noumenal
self:
action in accordance with laws, and even so to be an end in itself, and set
ends for oneself, is nothing other than a certain identity of the rules of
desire. In any case, this relates itself to the transcendental self-consciousness,
to the I, and at the same time thereby, along with this [transcendental self-
consciousness, it] can just as well change from one transcendental substrate
to the other, and so be a property that is passed on. (KGA I.1, 545)
Schleiermacher’s argument is that “action in accordance with laws”
does not presuppose the identity of a noumenal, substantial self
that remains identical throughout its changes. For the possibility
exists that the practical imperatives structuring desire are passed
along baton-like, along with the transcendental unity of conscious-
ness itself. In such a case, one need not presuppose the identity of a
subject that acts in accordance with laws; rather all that is needed is
the preservation of the identity of the rules themselves, along with
the functional identity of the transcendental I. Schleiermacher does
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concede that “self-consciousness in the production of a represen-
tation, unity of self-consciousness in the production of a series of
representations, and . . . identity of the rules of desire” are necessary
conditions of moral personhood. They are not, however, sufficient
to establish that the self is a transcendentally free noumenal subject.
While Schleiermacher notes that for Kant “we stand in the intelli-
gible world for the sake of the moral law” (KGA I.1, 545) his own
view in Spinozism is that no element of our phenomenal experience,
including that of morality itself, requires us to posit that there are
substantial, noumenal selves.
Kant’s considered view was that it is our moral experience that
leads us to conclude that we are transcendentally free and members
of an intelligible world. The moral law confronts us as a fact of
reason. While as late as 1785 Kant is still trying to ground moral
insight in the spontaneity of theoretical reason,23 his mature view in
the Critique of Practical Reason recognizes such attempts as futile;24
he then posits moral insight as a fact of reason.25 Moral insight
23 In the Groundwork Kant argues “one cannot possibly think a reason that, in its
own consciousness, would receive steering from elsewhere in regard to its judgments;
for then the subject would ascribe the determination of its power of judgment not
to its reason but to an impulse.” Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of
Morals, 65 (4: 449).
24 For instance, in Reflexion 5442, Kant distinguishes between what he calls “logical
freedom” and “transcendental freedom.” He notes, “Logical freedom can be found in
rational acts, but not transcendental freedom.” Karl Ameriks argues that by the time
Kant produced the second edition of the first Critique in 1787, he had come to doubt
the argument that the cogito can establish transcendental freedom. He notes that in
the “general note” with which Kant concludes the revised section of the Paralogisms,
“he brings under critique the idea that dominates the arguments of all the moral texts
we have analyzed, namely, the spontaneity of thought. Kant does not deny that think-
ing exhibits a ‘pure spontaneity,’ but now he emphasizes that this represents merely a
‘logical function’ and that although it ‘does not exhibit the subject of consciousness
as appearance,’ it also does not ‘represent myself to myself as I am in myself ’ (B428).”
Karl Ameriks, “Kant’s Deduction of Freedom and Morality,” 71.
25 For an in-depth discussion of the differences in Kant’s views as presented in
Groundwork III and the second Critique, see Ameriks, “Kant’s Deduction of Freedom
and Morality,” 45–65. Ameriks notes that in the Groundwork, “the assertion of our
freedom seemed to be based on the assertion of morality, which in turn rested on
an appeal to freedom. Now instead of the last step, which does involve a circular
grounding, no step at all and so no theoretical grounding is offered. In the place of
ambitious but understandable attempts at a strict deduction Kant has fallen back into
the invocation of an alleged a priori fact of practical reason” 66. See also Karl Ameriks,
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consists not only in rationally determining what the moral law is,
but also in the fact that the moral law confronts us as a demand.
As Henrich has put it, the moral law is “not an arbitrary matter
of fact.” Rather, it must be “originally affirmed” by us, since to say
that something is good is also to accept it “in its being.”26 This
grounds Kant’s understanding of positive freedom, that is, the moral
law can function as an incentive to action. This means that our fun-
damental commitment to morality has consequences for our onto-
logical commitments. Morality cannot be grounded in theoretical
or speculative thought. Rather, our theoretical reflections must be
informed by our moral commitments. For the mature Kant, it is
the fact that morality confronts us in this way that leads us to posit
our transcendental freedom and the idea that we are members of
an intelligible world. Our affirmation of the absolute value of the
moral law as the standard of action cannot simply be taken as one
empirically conditioned desire among others. It is through reason
that we recognize its unconditioned character and validity. But as
I argued in Chapter 1, the recognition of such an unconditional
demand and its capacity to influence us also implied, for Kant, tran-
scendental freedom and the causality of reason. And since the cat-
egory of substance and freedom mutually imply one another, this
has the implication that we must think of ourselves as intelligible
substances.
By the time that Schleiermacher writes the Monologen in 1800 we
find that a major reversal has taken place in his thought. Instead
of the monism he defends in Spinoza essays, he affirms a qual-
ified monadic individualism. This reversal is ultimately informed
by some of the same ethical concerns driving Kant’s philoso-
phy, although in Schleiermacher the problems and their solu-
tions will be developed quite differently. But it is important to
recognize that Schleiermacher does not so much repudiate Kant’s
thought as move beyond him. His own achievements in ethics,
which are quite significant, would have been impossible without his
predecessor.
Kant’s Theory of Mind, in particular chapter VI, “Independence.” Cf. Henrich, “The
Concept of Moral Insight,” 55–87, especially 82.
26 Dieter Henrich, “The Concept of Moral Insight,” 61.
